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1Introduction
In 2013, The British Geological Survey presented updated assessments that the Bowland-Hodder 
shale play in the North o f England has a range o f 822 trillion cubic feet to 2281 trillion cubic feet 
in shale resources (Andrews, 2013). Though technological and economic constraints have yet to 
be applied to this resource estimation, this shale play has the potential to dramatically alter the 
United Kingdom’s energy mix and security should the nation move to a large-scale operations 
phase. This possible energy resource has elicited pushes o f support, opposition, or caution among 
the British government, industry, academia, environmental groups, and the general public. The 
United Kingdom’s lack o f experience in accessing shale gas, considered an unconventional natural 
gas resource, requires a thorough examination o f shale gas development in regions that have 
experienced such development.
The United States serves as the primary national example o f full scale shale industry, which has 
been operating in earnest since the late 2000s. However, the experiences within the United States 
are far from uniform. Because the industry is generally regulated at a state level, it is possible to 
break the industry into a number o f case studies and examine the dynamics o f various actors 
(regulatory bodies, industrial players, members o f society) in states that have differing levels o f 
economic dependence on the energy or extractive industries; such studies could highlight how 
opportunity or risk is perceived, and the level o f individual or coordinated interventions involved. 
The technological success o f accessing previously uncommercial shale resources has been noted 
all over the world, and while there are some promising resource estimates in other countries, 
various roadblocks and conditions may inhibit the development o f shale gas industry beyond the 
exploration phase. This project considers some factors that may affect the development o f shale
gas industry in a given region, namely in shale gas producing American states and the fledgling 
exploration activities occurring in the United Kingdom.
This project considers the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier P. , 1988) from the 
adjacent discipline o f political science that includes economic or environmental or engineering 
analysis as components o f a framework that draws theoretical insights from other social science 
disciplines. In particular, the ACF is considered because o f its applicability to policy issues that 
are especially complicated or politically contentious; the inclusion o f technical information as a 
vital factor appears especially relevant, as both media coverage and scholarly literature address the 
many points o f debate within both economic and environmental contexts, the details o f which are 
hotly contested from value preference, theoretical, and empirical standpoints. The project mines 
literature concerning both theoretical and empirical experiences using the ACF and addresses some 
limitations or needs for refinement, in general, that have been voiced regarding the framework and 
discusses potential applicability and insights the framework may have for defined US and UK 
political systems experiencing past or future development o f shale gas industries.
The project’s primary objectives are to highlight potential issues or opportunities with respect to 
shale gas development and, in so doing, better comprehend the topic as a social issue. This project 
will examine several o f these conditions, whether economic, environmental, geological, or 
political, that potentially make or break the development o f shale gas resources. Factors similar 
to these are often threaded into analyses o f the ACF methodologies employed by public policy 
researchers in energy or environmental studies.
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The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Overview
Recent scholarship in public policy research has seen an increase in theory development and 
applied studies using the ACF to achieve more nuanced understanding o f policy processes. The 
ACF is considered both a “bottom-up” and “top-down” approach; its sector-based focus is 
designed for a better capture o f complex processes and interactions between relevant coalitions 
involved in particular policy change but it also considers effects from higher levels o f government 
(Cairney, 2015). First introduced in 1988 (Sabatier P. , 1988), the ACF periodically undergoes 
revisions to theoretical and empirical aspects; initially applied for pluralist/federalist subsystems, 
particularly the United States, there have been concerted efforts to adapt it to W estminster and 
other political subsystems (Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
2006). This framework is especially applied for policy issues comprising a complex mix of 
motivated actors (who form coalitions) and levels o f government; uses o f the ACF range from 
energy and environmental issues to health and social policies. Generally, the framework pulls 
from elements o f psychology and other behavioral sciences and improves upon the previous 
paradigm of the stages heuristic, which tended to see policy making as a cycle o f stages and lost 
its luster in the discipline as researchers sought approaches that were less simplistic and offered 
better explanatory power (Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
2006).
Basic assumptions o f the ACF are as follows (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy 
Coalition Framework: An Assessment, 1999):
1) The policy process is strongly influenced by technical information, as such information is 
involved in learning and is considered by actors in decision making.
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2) At least ten years are required to understand policy change and outcomes.
3) The primary unit o f analysis is the policy subsystem, which includes the topic, geographic 
scope, institutional structure, and actors involved, rather than a single program or 
government entity.
4) Officials from all levels o f government, the media, scientists, and other professionals are 
included in the analysis, moving beyond the classical “iron triangle” relationships, which 
only considers a limited number o f actors (Congress, bureaucracy, and interest groups) at 
a singular level o f government.
5) Policies are translations o f beliefs.
Figure 1: Theoretical Structure of ACF (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, Themes and Variations: 
Taking Stock o f the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2009)
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5Policy Subsystems
Policy subsystems involve a defined geographical and institutional scope in which advocacy 
coalitions competitively interact to influence policymaking; common beliefs drive coordination 
among actors and coalitions may be comprised o f  government officials, members o f  non­
governmental organizations, universities, media, or trade bodies. Relatively stable parameters
structure the nature of the problem, constrain the resources available to policy participants, establish the rules 
and procedures for changing policy and reaching collective decisions, and broadly frame the values that 
inform policymaking (Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006).
Natural resources, governmental structure, and cultural attitudes and norms are unlikely to change
over a very long period o f time. As such, efforts by actors are generally not directed to these
parameters (Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006). A fairly
long timeframe is required (typically 7-10 years) for a subsystem to mature, or experience a policy
cycle; during this time a feedback learning effect occurs and there is sufficient presence and
expertise o f  experienced actors at all levels o f  government concerned with the defined problem
(Advocacy Coalition Framework Overview, 2014).
Avenues of Policy Change
The primary goal o f the ACF is to make sense o f policy change; change occurs through inter- or 
intra-coalition learning effects, a “hurting stalemate”, or external or internal shocks (Weible & 
Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006). Belief systems are the 
cornerstone o f this framework; individuals are assumed to operate within a hierarchy o f beliefs, 
which include deep core beliefs, which refer to ingrained, elemental philosophical notions, such 
as position on a political spectrum (e.g. liberal or conservative) or basic values and exist across 
more than a particular policy subsystem. Policy core beliefs concern an actor’s value preferences
in the defined policy subsystem (e.g. government power distributions and jurisdictions or 
preferences in basic market structures) and while this level o f  beliefs is more likely to change over 
time, they are still fairly rooted and unyielding. Finally, secondary beliefs refer to the specifics of 
the policy itself (e.g. particulars o f funding or utilization efforts) and are the most changeable level 
o f beliefs (Cairney, 2015; Sabatier P. A., Theories o f the Policy Process, 2007). The learning 
process in the ACF is filtered through belief systems, which typically results in the rejection o f 
information that conflicts with the most fundamental deep core beliefs (Cairney, 2015). As 
cognitive misers, individuals turn to heuristic shortcuts and therefore think and work within 
bounded rationality; they also tend to be risk averse and remember losses more vividly than gains. 
Via the “devil shift”, opponents are considered more sinister and powerful than they actually are 
(Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006). Banded into advocacy 
coalitions, which is defined as actors who share policy core beliefs and coordinate in to a 
“nontrivial degree”, resources and framing techniques are directed and implemented to influence 
policymaking; coalitions seek venues to access points at which such influence can be directed 
(Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006; Weible, Sabatier, & 
McQueen, Themes and Variations: Taking Stock o f the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2009). 
Policy brokers are mediators who work in an official capacity to resolve intense conflict between 
coalitions, are generally considered trustworthy by the coalitions, and are typically civil servants 
such as judges (Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006). 
“Hurting stalemates” occur when “policy participants on both sides o f the issue consider the status 
quo unacceptable and perceive no alternate venues for achieving their objectives” (Weible & 
Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006).
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Exogenous factors are major shifts in the economic, political, or cultural environment that may 
affect the actors inside the policy subsystem. These external shocks may shuffle actors across 
coalitions or shift the balance o f  resources. However, the shock itself is insufficient to create 
change; this relies on a coalition’s “skillful exploitation” o f the shock. The ACF considers the 
resources at hand to be financial, legal, informational, persuasive, and personnel in nature, and 
coalitions will attempt to direct these resources in whatever venue opportunity they can access 
(Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006). Internal shocks occur 
when there is a perceived failure within coalitions’ abilities to implement successful policy 
outcomes and coalitions experience a loss in members or power (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 
Themes and Variations: Taking Stock o f the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2009).
Applications
Researchers who apply the ACF define the actors and scope o f the policy subsystem empirically 
usually by interviewing and survey data, either informally or through Likert scales and open 
comments; media reports or document reviews may also be used to help define the subsystem’s 
dimensions. The historical context o f the policy problem is discussed. Highly intense policy issues 
typically result in clear identification o f coalitions (Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, 2006). Dominant and minority coalitions may be regarded as possessing 
hard or soft power to better understand hierarchies o f resources (Heinmiller, 2013). Methods such 
as clustering techniques are used to statistically demarcate coalitions (Elgin & Weible, 2013). 
Some studies are composed o f discussion without any statistical analysis, while others may employ 
a hybrid approach to strengthen the study’s utility.
The ACF predicts that learning across coalitions will occur through the level o f  secondary beliefs. 
The impact o f external events and the stability and coordination o f coalitions over time are often
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the major focus in applications. Defections among coalitions or counterintuitive alliances have 
been noted and discussed as well, leading the authors to touch upon the fallacy o f assuming that 
coalitions are necessarily homogenous in their beliefs or goals (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 
Themes and Variations: Taking Stock o f the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2009). Matti and 
Sandstrom are active researchers who have applied the ACF to Swedish subsystems and have 
challenged the binary for/against coalition sentiments in empirical efforts and emphasize 
negotiations rather than simply belief coordination as drivers o f influence in policymaking (Matti 
& Sandstrom, 2013).
Criticisms
Periodically the authors o f the ACF address criticisms, most o f which question theoretical 
constructs and potentially important omitted factors. Generally, critiques appear to be published 
by authors working within the discipline, and some o f  the major criticisms include:
1) The difficulty or limitations in applying the framework to non-American (i.e. non­
federalist) subsystems. The framework is also difficult to apply in general.
2) There is a tendency o f researchers to rely on secondary information (i.e. document 
review) or implement methods o f data collection that were “unclear or unspecified” 
(Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, Themes and Variations: Taking Stock o f the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, 2009).
3) There is a lack o f explicit theoretical definitions and empirical incorporation o f some 
of the major assumptive tenets o f the framework; a review of dozens o f applications 
demonstrated researchers ignoring or not adequately explaining the role o f the basic 
psychological aspects o f how coalitions view opponents or not defining the relatively 
stable parameters or failing to test the fram ework’s hypotheses (Weible, Sabatier, &
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McQueen, Themes and Variations: Taking Stock o f the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, 2009).
4) Shared belief systems do not necessarily guarantee a high degree o f coordinated 
behavior, resulting in free riding, or non-contribution in political efforts (Weible & 
Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 2006).
Adapting the Framework to Non-federalist Systems
W hile the ACF was usually initially applied to American case studies, researchers have been able 
to adapt it meaningfully for W estminster or corporatist systems, which generally experience more 
centralized and therefore less “sticky” policymaking; the relative distribution o f government 
powers in the United States lend to more veto points and more venues for coalitions to access to 
direct influence. “Coalition opportunity structures” are identified in non-federalist systems where 
coalitions may leverage their resources and expertise (Advocacy Coalition Framework Overview, 
2014).
Caution is recommended for those attempting the ACF on non-federalist countries, and great effort 
should be made to understand not only the institutional differences, but also the relative importance 
and autonomy o f  relevant agencies and the distribution o f  power between central governments and 
constituent states or provinces (Cairney, 2015).
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Inferences for Shale Gas Development and Policy
An economist may approach the topic o f shale gas development as one o f feasibility, in terms of 
cost or market conditions, while an engineer may focus on improving well integrity to avoid 
contamination issues. If  a researcher is concerned about the industry’s role in climate change, the 
entire point o f  reference may be one based in the scientific specifics o f  carbon emissions. Further, 
a political scientist may consider the geopolitical impacts o f shale gas, examining the relations 
between gas and oil producing states or the consequences o f  not meeting binding emissions 
reduction goals. Such professionals’ assessments often enter the discussion involving shale gas. 
A fairly extensive review of the literature revealed that the majority o f academic contributions 
have been economic or technical in scope. W hile these disciplines are great participants in the 
discourse, it became apparent that a greater picture o f shale gas development as a societal issue, 
down to the individual, is a struggle to conceptualize, particularly with respect to Great Britain. 
Uncertainties surround the conditions in which development is being pursued, and while the UK- 
based literature was extremely sparse on the domestic front, those referring to American 
experiences are often as skeptical as they are enthusiastic. While the government’s current stance 
appears to be one o f  cautious optimism, largely pointing out the benefits enjoyed from the United 
States’ dramatic growth in shale industry, efforts have begun to adequately gauge and track British 
societal reaction (Kotsakis, 2012; O'Hara, Humphrey, Jaspal, Nerlich, & Knight, 2013).
This section highlights some of the identified efforts, issues, and discourse occurring with shale 
gas development in general (or as is occurring in the United States and therefore is relevant in 
British discussion) and attempts to make inferences from the ACF’s ambitions and past 
applications.
Themes and Approaches in Shale Gas Development Discourse and Research
Though the literature addressing the main policy issues surrounding shale gas extraction is 
growing, the sheer scope and complexity o f  the industry coupled with the swift pace o f  growth in 
the United States (and to an extent, Canada) has highlighted the dearth in relevant literature and 
therefore has warranted a call for more comprehensive and clear research agenda. In addition to 
moving to a better compiling and understanding o f the pertinent economic and environmental data, 
social considerations play a vital role in crafting appropriate decision criteria as the shale industry 
matures in the United States (Bazilian, et al., 2014) and potentially moves beyond the exploratory 
phase in the United Kingdom. Despite the relative scarcity o f  relevant literature, academic themes 
became apparent and reflected the discourse in media. Social considerations include enhanced 
understanding o f public perception o f shale gas development, particularly in the nascent stages in 
the United Kingdom, the framing methods by various actors, including those who would use 
economic arguments as a primary justification for shale development. Legal concerns are related 
to permitting processes and environmental regulation; economic factors include availability o f  
infrastructure, market dynamics, and labor. Engineering or climate change-related aspects are used 
in both offensive and defensive positions and are generally concerned with water contamination 
and greenhouse gas mitigation or contribution. Energy security is another facet in a geopolitical 
context.
Approaches o f research and debate originate from a variety o f scientific fields, largely from the 
social sciences and engineering and earth science disciplines, and attempt to tackle identified 
“problems”, concerns, or contentions using their own established models or language; as discussed 
by Ostrom in Sabatier’s book comparing policy process frameworks, this can result in disjointed, 
disassociated research agenda that does not adequately capture underlying or unseen dynamics
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inherent in institutional motives and actions and policy processes (Sabatier P. A., Theories o f the 
Policy Process, 2007). Shale gas development exists or is potential in a variety o f institutional 
settings (as well as geologically varying environments, which could also create concerns or invalid 
expectations); it is important for researchers to consider and communicate effectively in 
identifying issues, implementing research approaches, and disseminating results. Given that 
actors, including academics, are often working on personal or institutional agendas or with insular 
methodologies, shale gas development, like any potentially contentious energy source, is regularly 
mired in fierce debate that is potentially grounded in heuristic assumptions or highly disputed 
information (such as emissions data) that is difficult to model empirically or to persuasively 
disseminate and therefore are more subject to diminishment or dismissal.
The heterogeneous nature o f  experiences raises the question as to which approach (or approaches) 
is appropriate when examining shale gas development in and across relevant regions. W hile the 
intricacies o f  an issue as complex as shale gas development (beyond project economics or the 
broader markets such an industry operates within) arguably cannot be reasonably captured or 
thoroughly analyzed in any particular framework or formal theoretical models, attempts to best 
articulate and develop process theories are nonetheless imperative i f  we are to fairly and adequately 
cover the most serious and pertinent points o f  analysis.
It is here that we can further consider some of the conceptual merits o f the ACF as they relate to 
shale gas issues in the US and the UK.
Defining a Subsystem
The definition and demarcation o f  a subsystem are approached differently by researchers who 
study and apply the ACF but are recommended to be defined empirically by interviewing relevant
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actors o f the subsystem (Weible & Sabatier, A Guide to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, 
2006). One should consider when defining a subsystem the “legal autonomy of each level” and 
“actor integration across levels” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
An Assessment, 1999). Subsystems can interrelate, whether overlapping- in which cases there 
may be expertise in more than a single subsystem- or with subsystems existing as a subset of 
another. The relative intensities o f participation can vary between the interrelated subsystems.
Going with the assertion (Centner & O'Connell, 2014; Davis, 2012) that hydraulic fracturing 
(fracking) regulation in the United States exists nearly completely at the state level, with minimum 
intervention or key exemptions from federal regulation, one may define a subsystem for fracking 
policy at a state or even municipal level. The municipal subsystem may be nested within the state 
system, with overlapping actors, particularly state legislators, environmental groups, and gas 
companies. In the United Kingdom, as the geographical knowledge o f shale plays are improved, 
one would consider the relative powers o f each affected member nation (England, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and W ales) have concerning permitting access to fracking sites when defining 
the subsystem; the entire United Kingdom may then exist as a subsystem of the European Union, 
as the United Kingdom is bound by carbon emissions objectives and may experience pressures by 
other EU bodies to limit fracking. The majoritarian institutional structure o f the United Kingdom 
would require particular needs for adapting the ACF to adequately account for the lack o f official 
veto points; authors could look at possible efforts by the government to create venues for public 
inputs or the abilities o f local permitting bodies to undermine centralized government’s attempts 
to streamline application processes.
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Public Perception of Shale Gas
Public opinion has the potential to influence regulatory bodies to respond to extraction industries; 
it now has an enhanced role in the ACF. Despite its importance, the shale gas public perception 
literature is fairly sparse, especially as it pertains to the United Kingdom. By and large studies are 
confined to the United States (Boudet, et al., 2014; Wynveen, 2011; Kriesky, Goldstein, Zell, & 
Beach, 2013; Schafft, Borlu, & Glenna, 2013; Theodori, Introduction: Special issue on social 
issues associated wtih unconventional natural gas development, 2011; Theodori, Perception o f the 
natural gas industry and engagement in individual civic actions, 2013) and mainly related to the 
Marcellus Shale and Barnett Shale in Pennsylvania and Texas, respectively. In the United 
Kingdom, The University o f  Nottingham has conducted a series o f  nationally representative public 
opinion surveys since 2012 to monitor awareness, associations, and approval o f shale gas 
extraction and has tracked increasing awareness and shifting associations with environmental 
concerns and economic benefits (i.e. identifying earthquake or water contamination with fracking 
or cheap energy) and a decreasing but marginally favorable opinion concerning the inclusion o f 
shale gas in the domestic energy mix (O'Hara, Humphrey, Jaspal, Nerlich, & Knight, 2013).
As with the United Kingdom, opinion polls in the United States show that Americans generally 
support shale gas extraction. Also paralleled is a substantial portion o f both populations at the 
national level still with little to no familiarity with shale gas extraction (Boudet, et al., 2014), 
despite widespread media coverage o f both the economic benefits and environmental risks in the 
United States and government support and activist protests in the United Kingdom.
A nationally representative survey in the United States by Boudet et al (2014) examined the socio­
demographic predictors o f support in the United States and asked respondents to relay their “top 
o f mind” associations with hydraulic fracturing. They found that o f those who were even aware
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of the process (and 39% were not aware at all), the majority (58%) could not describe the process 
in any relevant or unambiguous terms. Few mentioned economic, environmental, or social 
impacts. The authors found that age, conservative ideology, and formal education positively 
predicted support (their hypothesis that formal education was negatively associated to fracking 
support was not supported), while female gender and egalitarian worldviews were negatively 
associated with support. Their hypothesis that an individualist worldview, which is strongly 
associated with American cultural attitudes, was not predictive o f support.
Science Communication and Policy
The discourse over shale gas is assessed from many angles, including climate change mitigation, 
energy security, natural gas prices, political and economic (trade) relationships, and economic 
growth. Researchers interested in how shale gas extraction is debated or perceived must look to 
how the messages concerning information about economic, environmental, or other technical shale 
extraction information is structured.
A classic model for science communication is the deficit model, which posits that as publics 
become better informed of a scientific topic their perceptions and beliefs move closer to the 
scientific consensus. However, some researchers (Hart & Nisbet, 2012) suggest that perception 
and support for some issues are closely tied to social identity, which may include political 
affiliation, and that the deficit model is not an adequate tool to better communicate some topics 
such as climate change or emerging technologies. The topic o f shale gas extraction may be another 
that does not fit the deficit model assumptions o f science communication; as Boudet et al. (2014) 
discussed in their fracking survey, conservative ideology is a strong predictor o f fossil fuel 
development generally and was positively related to fracking support in the model. Should further 
scientific studies support claims o f environmental damage resulting from shale gas development,
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it may be unlikely that these typically core identities and beliefs could be changed easily even with 
increased access to scientific information; with evidence to the contrary, resistance to change may 
occur among individuals with anti-fracking sentiments associated with deep core beliefs. This 
would seemingly support the ACF hypothesis that fundamental values are highly resistant to 
change and that technical information is filtered and potentially rejected when it conflicts with 
those beliefs. However, the effect o f technical information on policy core or secondary beliefs 
with respect to shale gas should be a focus in future work, as experts work to consensus in certain 
scientific aspects o f shale gas impacts and awareness o f fracking continues.
Unfortunately, even a cursory review o f  the literature showcases ongoing debates in scientific 
circles concerning some of the environmental impacts o f shale gas extraction, so what counts as 
“consensus” may be currently inapplicable in some respects. This includes the notion o f shale gas 
support as a fuel “bridge” to a lower carbon energy mix (Schrag, 2012), reservations about the 
efficacy o f regulation (Centner & O'Connell, 2014) in the United States and globally, with trade 
secret protection posing a threat to trust o f industry (Leggette, et al., 2013). Economic studies of 
the impacts o f shale gas are sometimes called into question (Kinnaman, 2011) as academia is 
increasingly affiliated with and funded by industry. W hile this project cannot meaningfully 
evaluate some o f the engineering or climate change literature’s methodologies, the economic 
impacts can be discussed briefly, as the project believes that it is here where some of the most 
powerful arguments for shale gas development will be expressed.
Economic Benefits of Shale Gas, Local and National
Economic benefits accompanying the extraction o f  shale gas are often touted to motivate the 
acceptance o f the industry; such benefits may include tax receipts, jobs, and an improved balance 
o f payments as the import bill shrinks thanks to domestic production and lower import prices.
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Though studies may present varying levels o f economic impacts, they typically do report positive 
effects or promising future effects (Considine, Watson, & Blumsack, 2010; Weber, 2012); industry 
and government therefore have a potentially convincing and popular argument to justify the 
development o f shale resources in the presence o f sufficient regulation.
Much like perceived or actual technical or environmental deficiencies concerning shale gas 
activities enter the debate, economic benefits are subject to scrutiny, particularly if  weighed against 
the costs o f negative environmental externalities. However, these externalities are arguably far 
more difficult to measure than tax receipts or job figures. Proponents o f shale gas development, 
such as energy companies or coalitions, could use the more digestible and tractable economic 
figures to better bolster their arguments for development or continued activities.
These many points o f discussion suggest that the ambiguity and uncertainties in shale gas 
development make for great difficulty in reaching a point o f scientific or political consensus, even 
among relevant coalitions that may be identified in future research. However, the very nature of 
shale gas development and extraction is subject to argumentative manipulations or vague 
conceptual associations, even if  people do not actually understand the scientific material they are 
presented with. W hile the ACF does hold central the role o f technical information in the analysis 
concerning policy related learning, the concept o f “skillful exploitation” o f events here may be the 
more germane one; competing viewpoints and conclusions on the merits o f shale gas, all with their 
own models and evidences, must be either convincing enough to policy decision makers or to 
dominate coalitions to push or stop shale activity. In either case it may not be truly relevant 
whether publics believe shale gas development is “good” or “bad” for the economy or the 
environment; those who have the power to drive the policy process may also be completely off the 
mark in terms o f the economic or environmental facts. Also, even if  actors intend rational
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outcomes, their inability to foresee the realities o f markets and intelligently weigh all scientific 
considerations could result in or contend with “wrong” consequences, such as stranded assets, 
worsening o f climate change, souring o f political relations, or environmental contamination.
The Cases of Energy and Climate Change Policy in Colorado
Applications o f the ACF vary across institutional structures and policy contexts, and the project 
sought literature from which to attempt direct insight for shale gas development. A handful of 
case studies concerning the state o f Colorado are potentially enlightening. Colorado is particularly 
interesting because o f its geographical vulnerabilities to climate change effects, the presence o f a 
voter approved or state legislated renewable energy initiatives and carbon reduction goals, and the 
extent o f fossil fuels industry.
Elgin and W eible (2013) identified pro and anti-climate change coalitions merging ACF and the 
Policy Analytical Capacity (PAC) approaches; PAC measures the capacity o f individuals in terms 
o f formal training (i.e. statistical modelling or expertise in analyzing policy in this case) using 
questionnaire data; the results found that the major coalitions possessed members o f broadly 
similar levels o f formal training and experience in their fields and length o f engagement in 
influencing policy. The higher the capacity an individual or coalition possesses, the PAC asserts, 
the more policy is likely to be affected by their efforts. The study was descriptive in nature but 
does better inform the literature on the coalition structure o f involved actors in Colorado 
policymaking.
Another study by Laird (2008) discussed the atypical case o f a successful intervention o f an 
environmental group on regulatory energy policy. A typically collegial relationship between the 
Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and the state’s foremost electric utility turned
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adversarial in 2001 when the PUC ordered the utility to construct a wind power plant; the utility 
vehemently opposed the plan and made great efforts to demonstrate the plant’s economic 
unfeasibility. Laird referred to the informational and social relationships shared by regulatory 
bodies and utilities, in which both parties consult professionals for their technical information to 
make decisions based on economic, engineering, environmental, and social impacts o f  their 
actions. In this regard, utilities often possess far greater information and power than coalitions 
with environmental protection designs and certainly more than the general public. The asymmetry 
o f power, information, and incentive, along with an often dependent relationship on the part of 
regulatory bodies on utilities in terms o f  expertise, often results in utilities enjoying more beneficial 
policy results. Deregulation o f  utilities from legal monopolies to retail entities have not 
meaningfully shifted the fundamentals o f  the relationship between regulators and utilities, he 
asserts, which is based on regulators facing realities o f  fossil fuel reliance, dependence on utilities 
for information, limited political involvement, and decisions made on pricing calculations and 
exchange o f  arguments based on exchanges technical in nature. In the case o f  Colorado, the 
structure exists still in the conventional legal monopoly/state regulators dynamic. The PUC 
considers market realities o f  any manner o f  electric generation, whether created using fossil fuels 
or renewable sources, such as wind. A large cost differential would make the calculation simple 
for decision making, but as (usually subsidized) experience in renewable energy increases, 
generation costs tend to decrease. The closer the renewable costs to conventional costs, the more 
difficult it becomes to argue against the implementation o f  renewable energy generation.
In Colorado, the regulatory body’s governance is relatively autonomous and stable, the decision 
making process long steered by notions o f economic and technical efficiencies. However, the PUC 
began to exhibit a consideration o f environmental externalities from utilities’ actions in cost
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calculations, suggesting institutional learning effects. The PUC also encouraged public 
involvement and mandated the utility to consider the needs o f customers as a formal component 
o f their planning; even though the utility still held asymmetrical levels o f power and influence in 
this situation, it did create opportunities for potential intervention by environmental groups far less 
equipped with expertise and people.
A salient point o f the case is that the decision by the PUC to mandate a wind power plant was not 
due solely by environmental protection advocacy or renewable portfolio requirements. The 
rationale was economic, in direct opposition to the utility’s economic arguments. The success of 
the environmental group also demonstrated that efforts by dominant coalitions could be subverted 
in the face o f institutional learning and if  there exists actors in an official capacity who would and 
could make policy decisions based on learning effects. Laird considered this case revolutionary 
in its potential effects on neighboring states and for utility regulation policy in general (Laird, 
2008).
These studies suggest that Colorado would be an academically interesting subsystem in which to 
conduct ACF analysis and attempt to compare to the United Kingdom. In addition, the state, much 
like the United Kingdom, possesses renewable energy and carbon reduction initiatives and a 
generally favorable (politically speaking) business environment.
Connecting the Pieces
Congregating the known and uncertain elements in the US and UK can enhance the 
conceptualization o f the many aspects o f shale gas development. W hile the ACF has limited 
predictive power, the efforts by its researchers do inform the body of knowledge concerning 
mechanics o f policy processes. Shale gas development may not have direct parallels with its
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current body o f applications, but knowing where certain actors may concentrate their efforts and 
policymaking trends in similar situations (as well as anomalous cases) at the very least produce a 
clearer picture o f a very complex issue that spans many scientific disciplines and swaths o f society. 
Integrating points o f  analysis could highlight where further outreach and communication between 
experts and publics could be improved.
Shale gas development in the UK is largely conjecture at this point in terms o f economic or 
technical feasibility, though attempts to understand and predict the industry’s growth and effects 
are ongoing. Because the UK will look to US experiences to gauge their own abilities and 
tolerances to accommodate a potentially contentious industry, increased social research and 
literature is clearly warranted. O f course, policymakers and industrial actors will not necessarily 




This project began with a drive to better understand how or why shale gas development may or 
may not occur and as the review o f  the literature progressed, an increasing dissatisfaction with 
conceptual goals turned the focus away from primarily economic considerations. The ability to 
sufficiently conceptualize the complexity and interactive dimensions o f  an issue such as shale gas 
development is somewhat limited when expertise is directed at single points o f analysis without 
an adequate synthesis o f those seemingly disparate points; not least o f all, the human aspects can 
easily get lost in the shuffle.
Despite the potential insights gleaned from an emerging paradigmatic approach from an adjacent 
social discipline, a student o f economics may initially scoff at the relatively indefinite theoretical 
constructs and seemingly ad hoc methodologies apparent in applications o f the ACF. Admittedly, 
much literature in policymaking processes laments and criticizes the lack o f formal rigor as exists 
generally in the discipline. To be sure, the framework’s authors and those who have applied it 
have endeavored over time to better enhance its usefulness, applicability, and power; its ambitious 
goals and relative empirical robustness have ensured (or allowed) its survival thus far. W hether 
the framework finds credibility among other social scientists, such as economists, depends on those 
scientists’ openness and expectations in taking on interdisciplinary approaches to problems 
typically undertaken with notions relatively bounded in disciplinary segregation.
The project’s work produced some insights about the social sciences in general. The approach a 
researcher may take is likely dependent on inherent philosophies and consensus rooted in a 
discipline in which one works. This project’s goals could have been to attempt an analysis of 
economic impacts o f policy or industry and inform prescriptive efforts to improve efficiencies,
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which is presumed to help society. The project concludes that it serves as one o f many 
foundational stones attempting to bridge disciplinary gulfs and work towards clarity in a topic 
easily muddled in debate and highly susceptible to manipulative arguments.
In any event, knowledge for its own sake is never a lost cause, and drawing insights from (or 
directing constructive criticisms toward) other scientific tactics in the very least creates lively 
discourse. In the quite lively topic o f shale gas development, the project makes some conclusions 
as regards the ACF.
The ambitions o f the framework itself are admirable and appear flexible in terms o f their 
applicability. However, much o f the theoretical underpinnings have yet to be formalized in a 
manner that might be acceptable to encourage further cross-discipline work; reviewing the 
literature suggests this is the case, as the framework’s drawing o f concepts from other disciplinary 
concepts is largely unilateral. W hether this is on account o f hubris among more visible or more 
formalized social science fields or because it is legitimately due to the limitations o f a young and 
somewhat nebulous and loose framework, as it stands the ACF is more or less a rising star in its 
own sub discipline o f policy making.
The project does contemplate the possible integration o f formal economic theory into the ACF; 
also unclear is if  and to what extent economic “information” is subsumed under the definition of 
“technical information” that the ACF considers crucial in the role o f coalition learning. To be 
sure, economists are routinely sought after for their input into policy formulation and their analyses 
are frequently and often widely disseminated and interpreted in academic, industrial, and other 
contexts and purposes. Economists’ efforts are also often interventionist in nature, formulated to 
produce action toward more “efficient” or desirable outcome for society, though the exact 
beneficiaries of such efforts may be debated for “fairness” for marginalized populations or for its
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considerations for the environment. Much o f the economic literature concerning shale gas was 
concerned with gains in income or other market effects. Conversely, publications with an 
environmental bent were sometimes lacking in economic deliberation. It is ultimately incumbent 
upon policymakers to weigh the environmental/economic nexus appropriately.
Questions about free riding also are raised. As a persistent issue particularly in environmental 
planning, the tendency o f  public participation to suffer due to passive individuals riding on the 
efforts o f others is a problem those who advocate increased participation to boost the legitimacy 
o f policy (Rydin & Pennington, 2000). At a state or national level, even if  fracking is perceived 
as an environmental (or economic) net negative for society, collective action issues may occur. 
Negative media coverage may contribute to individuals’ association with fracking and negative 
environmental externalities, but associations may not be sufficient enough to stimulate meaningful 
participatory activities among the general public. The notion o f rational ignorance from public 
choice theory suggests that individuals may also choose not to seek out additional information 
should the costs (in terms o f  time, energy, and effort) be deemed higher than the impact on 
policymaking that the individual may believe him /herself to affect (Rydin & Pennington, 2000). 
The ACF appears to consider free riding as regards political behavior, i.e. some of those who share 
beliefs with coalitions will neglect to participate in directing policy.
Finally, clarity on adapting the framework to W estminster systems would be useful; this project 
found very limited information regarding how to do so and exactly what to consider. The very 
goal o f  the project was somewhat stymied by the lack o f  guidelines in this matter and did not 
produce a satisfactory analysis for theoretical considerations for future US and UK ACF 
comparative applications.
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In the end, a complete synthesis o f any particular topic with multiple points o f scientific analysis, 
even with neutral dissemination o f information, no matter how accurate, is not likely to result in 
desired efficient or fair outcomes. This may be the most valuable takeaway from the project’s 
examination o f the ACF: possibly no analysis is immune from the influence o f belief systems, as 
long as human beings cannot or will not process all relevant information, they disagree on the 
basics o f how society should be structured, there exists possibilities for free riding or rent-seeking 
behavior, profound tradeoffs between environmental protection and economic development 
remain, and those who endeavor to understand or create new knowledge, no matter the motive or 
results, do not or cannot coordinate and collaborate and may not necessarily encourage optimal 
outcomes no matter how they are defined.
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Recommendations for Further Study
An obvious recommendation for further research is empirical analysis o f American subsystems to 
explain policy change as it relates to shale gas. O f particular interest may be the opening o f public 
land for drilling, extraction activities in highly populated residential areas, or states that share plays 
or have disputes concerning water or waste management.
A particularly interesting future study would concern the release o f the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s report o f the potential impacts on groundwater from hydraulic fracturing. The report, 
with an expected release in 2014, will undoubtedly be challenged no matter whether the results are 
favorable to industry or anti-fracking bodies. Much like the notion or validity o f economic 
benefits, the perception or validity o f environmental concerns may or may not have meaningful 
bearing on policymaking. Enhanced theoretical development o f public policy processes 
concerning the success or failure o f framing techniques, particularly in the energy-economic nexus 
o f varying subsystems would help to better inform cross-discipline work in energy policy. Further, 
improved applications across differently structured subsystems will better enhance understanding 
o f diffusion o f technology or other goals, such as the replication o f economic benefits and 
avoidance o f environmental issues.
This project attempts to inform on its own merits; however, it does inform future doctoral research 
by the author, in a project that will examine drivers o f public opinion and policy as regards shale 
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